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Christianity in Indonesia: An Overview 
 
by Susanne Schröter 
 
Introduction 
 
Indonesia is a multicultural and multireligious nation whose heterogeneity is 
codified in the state doctrine, the Pancasila
1. Yet the relations between the various 
social, ethnic, and religious groups have been problematic down to the present day, 
and national unity has remained fragile. In several respects, Christians  have  a 
precarious role in the struggle for shaping the nation. They  are  a small minority 
(about 9% of the population) in a country predominantly inhabited by Muslims; in the 
past they were interconnected in manifold ways with the Dutch colonial government; 
they exert great influence in economy and the military, and constitute the majority of 
the population in some parts of the so-called Outer Islands (such as Flores, Sumba, 
and Timor), which are characterized by an attitude fraught with ambivalence towards 
the state apparatus perceived as ‘Javanese’ and ‘Muslim’. In the aftermath of the 
former president Suharto’s  resignation  and  in the course of the ensuing political 
changes – in particular the independence of East Timor – Christians were repeatedly 
discredited for allegedly posing a threat to Indonesian unity, and have been involved 
both as victims and perpetrators in violent regional clashes with Muslims that claimed 
thousands of lives.
2
 
 Since the beginning of the new millennium the violent conflicts 
have lessened, yet the pressure exerted on Christians by Islamic fundamentalists still 
continues undiminished in the Muslim-majority regions. The future of the Christians in 
Indonesia remains uncertain, and pluralist society is still on trial. For this reason the 
situation of Christians in Indonesia is an important issue  that goes far beyond 
research on a minority, touching on general issues relating to the formation of the 
nation-state.  
 
Christianity and Colonialism 
 
Archeological evidences of the existence of Christian communities  in 
Southeast Asia, probably Nestorians, in the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and Java can 
be traced back to the seventh century
3
                                                 
1 Pancasila is a Pali term that relates to five (panca) principles, or rules (sila). It goes back to the 
Buddhist moral teachings that demand the avoidance of five offences: killing, stealing, lying, 
immorality, and the consumption of drugs. In the Indonesian context the following principles were 
established: the belief in one God, democracy, social justice, humanitarianism, and national unity. 
.  During Portuguese  colonization in the 
sixteenth century, and also at the beginning of Dutch rule in the seventeenth century, 
the majority of those who later were to become Indonesians practised their traditional 
religions. Hinduism prevailed on Bali and in many parts of Java; the modern, trade-
2 Compare Searle (2002); Sidel (2006); Wessel and Wimhöfer (2001). 
3 Compare Goh (2005:1); Van Klinken (2003:7). 3 
 
oriented princedoms – primarily those in the coastal regions – had adapted Islam as 
an adequate social and religious system of rules. Dominicans, Jesuits, and various 
Protestant missionary societies began to spread the Christian faith among the 
adherers of the autochthonous religions. This explicitly also served the purpose of 
stemming the influence of Islam. East Flores  and its offshore islands became 
Catholic,
4
Both the colonial and the modern Indonesian state are intertwined with the 
developments undergone by Christianity. It is hardly possible to draw a dividing line 
between proselytization and colonialism, even though missionaries  and colonial 
officials did not always pursue the same interests.
  the greater part of the Moluccas, the Minahasa, and the Batak  region 
turned Protestant. In the twentieth century Christianity expanded to the hitherto 
unproselytized part of Flores, as well as to Timor, Roti and Sawu, Central Sulawesi, 
and among the Chinese minority. 
5  On the one hand, it is 
indisputable that Protestant and Catholic ideologies had a significant share in the 
implementation and acceptance of foreign rule. On the other hand, it was scarcely 
possible to reconcile the colonizers’ project of subduing and profitably exploiting the 
indigenous population with the idea of establishing a Christian non-European 
civilization. The diverging objectives resulted in diverging strategies of dealing with 
the indigenous peoples. While the colonial administrators played off the local 
customs against Islam, the missionaries tried to replace indigenous structures, ideas, 
and most notably religions with Christianity and European concepts of community. 
Colonial decision makers knew that Muslim leaders were hostile towards them, and 
they were aware of the powerful anti-colonial potential of Islam.
6 From their point of 
view, it was only natural to forge alliances with local rulers against the religious 
leaders. In many cases, such as the so-called Padri wars in West-Sumatra, they 
intervened in local conflicts on behalf of local elite and became, as Michael Laffan 
stated, “de facto partisans of adat
7
                                                 
4 Histories of Catholicism in Indonesia have been published by Muskens (1970, 1973, 1974, 1979) and 
Steenbrink (2003); Müller-Krüger (1957, 1966) and Hoekema (1994, 2001) wrote on Protestantism. A 
general history of Christianity and Islam has been written by Waver (1974); regional studies have been 
provides by several authors. To mention just a few of them Aritonang (1988) wrote on the process of 
proselytization  among the Batak, Dietrich (1989, 1994)  on Flores, Henley (1996) on Minahasa, 
Witschi (1942) on the Dajak of Borneo and Smith-Kipp (1990, 1995) on the Karo (-Batak).  
 against the shari’a” (Laffan 2003:110). In order to 
strengthen traditional non-religious local leadership the colonial government 
5 This is particularly true for Catholicism which arrived with the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. 
6 Anti-colonial Islamic movements even used the metaphor of a Holy War.  For Aceh see Teuku 
Ibrahim Alfian (2006), for West-Sumatra see Taufik Abdulla (1989) and Young (1994). Alfian (1994) 
has written about the Islamic movement Muhammadiyah under colonial rule and Steenbrink (1993) 
focuses on the relationship between Dutch colonialism and Islam.  
7 The term adat derives from the Arabic word  adat (sing. adah) and can be translated as local 
customs. Adat includes the local belief system, the symbolic order, architecture, the kinship order and 
a bunch of daily practises such as agrarian practises, handicraft techniques and rituals. It is a point of 
reference for jurisprudence and the administration of justice and legitimizes political and religious 
authority.  4 
 
commissioned ethnographic studies of adat  as well as of social and political 
structures, and legalized these local traditions.
8
The missionaries, who felt committed to a specific form of European civilization 
and associated the Christian faith with a package of community-building measures, 
were not only suspicious about adat  but often tried to eradicate it altogether, 
particularly those elements they defined as religious. The anthropologist Webb 
Keane has pointed out that the efforts of the missionaries basically aimed at 
correcting a supposed ‘illicit conflation of words, things, and persons’ (Keane 
1996:138). However, the extent to which the missionaries succeeded in destroying 
local cultures still needs to be ascertained by in-depth research, because these 
cultures turned out to be resilient, creatively striving to appropriate and transform the 
powerful ‘Other’. Local belief systems and ritual practices were forcibly crushed in 
some regions of Indonesia; in others the complete wipe-out of cultures was probably 
intended but could not be put into practice. Just as in other parts of the globe, local 
actors responded creatively to the confrontation with the powerful world religions. 
They created indigenous forms of Christianity, and in many cases convincingly 
succeeded in combining and interweaving the own and the foreign in such a way that 
essential elements of their cultures survived, even though sometimes in a modified 
form. In other cases cultures were indeed largely destroyed or became transformed; 
yet in these instances the actors were not helpless victims either, but rather found 
ways to take advantage of the new situation. Yet in order to convert them to 
Christianity, missionaries indisputably exerted considerable pressure on ethnic 
groups that avowed themselves to autochthonous religions. 
  
The relationship between the colonial government and the missionary 
societies was characterized both by divergences and convergences of interests. In 
order to avoid problems with the Indonesian Muslims, evangelical activities were 
strictly controlled and regulated. The societies needed a special missionary permit 
that in each case was only valid for a specific, designated region.
9  Muskens 
(1974:92) has pointed out that due to these restrictions the churches could not gain a 
foothold in many regions until after Indonesian independence. These problems 
notwithstanding, occasional dissonances between colonial officials and missionaries 
should not be overestimated. Both, missionaries and members of the colonial 
administration  were strictly against a further expansion of Islam.
10  Furthermore, 
despite the colonialist’s sympathy with local adat they took advantage of those who 
converted to Christianity and, thus, functionalized religion for political purposes.
11
                                                 
8 The gifted scholar of Islamic Studies, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, gained particular prominence as 
a researcher on Indonesian adat and as an adviser of the colonial government. He played a crucial role 
in the conquest and colonization of Aceh. Regarding the use of adat against Islam see also: Mahadi 
(1987:212). 
 
The colonial administration entrusted the missionary societies with important tasks in 
terms of development policy, putting them in charge of the educational and health 
9 This is why Flores, for example, became a purely Catholic mission area, whereas the Batak region on 
Sumatra was exclusively assigned to Protestant missionaries.  
10 Regarding the containment of Islam in Flores compare Steenbrink (2007:85-109). 
11 Compare Muskens (1979); Steenbrink (1993); Waver (1974). 5 
 
care sectors. On the island of Flores, for example, the entire build-up of the school 
and education system was put in the hands of the Societas Verbi Divini, a missionary 
society that still today plays a dominant role in the development of that region. Due to 
the missionary activities, a pronounced regional identity
12  that transcends ethnic 
identities emerged in many places, as well as indigenous Christian elite. The latter 
was viewed as a natural ally by many colonial officials, and benefitted from a school 
system, patterned on Western educational standards.
13  Well educated Christians 
were preferentially recruited for civil service by the colonial government, and got high 
positions in administration and the military. Generally, indigenous Christians exerted 
considerable influence in the course of Indonesian history
14
 
 and were able to leave 
their mark most notably in the spheres of education and health care. The 
economically affluent Chinese minority largely avows itself to the Christian faith as 
well. To this day, the resentments on the part of Indonesian Muslims are a result of 
that privileged status of the Christians and the concomitant identification of Christians 
with the colonial regime.  
 
Christianity in Postcolonial Indonesia 
 
When Indonesia had become independent, Christians initially feared that the 
conditions for their missionary activities might worsen, particularly because there had 
been repeated calls for a ban on Christian proselytization. Yet, this situation did not 
change after the colonial rule had ended. Wendelin Waver (1974:211) has pointed 
out that the Indonesian constitution actually created conditions that were much more 
favorable for Christian missionary societies than in colonial times. Affiliation with a 
monotheistic world religion is laid down in the Indonesian state philosophy and 
mandatory for any Indonesian citizen. Whoever does not adhere to one of these 
religions will likely be suspected of being an atheist. However, as atheism is viewed 
as synonymous with communism, which has been public enemy number one ever 
since a communist coup d’état was attempted in 1965, it is well-nigh suicidal not to 
adhere to any of the large, officially recognized religions.
15
                                                 
12 For the Minahasa, compare Henley (1993); for the Moluccas, see Kreuzer (2000). 
 As a matter of fact there 
was an expansion of Christian missionary activities, and in many spheres (such as 
the educational and health care systems) Christians were able  to establish a 
monopoly position. In numerous writings they moreover expressed the hope of 
13 According to a census conducted in the 1930s, the highest literacy rate of the entire colony was 
found in the Christianized Minahasa. It amounted to almost 40%, whereas it was only 12% in Jakarta 
and Surabaya, and lower than 10% in the rural Muslim areas. Compare Buchholt (1994:314-315).  
14 Compare Steenbrink (1995). 
15 Besides Islam, the officially recognized religions are Catholicism, Protestantism, Confucianism, 
Hinduism, and Buddhism. Judaism is not recognized. Hinduism appears in a localized Balinese 
variant. During the first years following independence the Balinese were subject to discrimination by 
Muslim and Christian politicians who denounced them as heathens and devoid of religion. Only when 
Hindu leaders defined their pantheon of deities as the manifestation of one single god and became 
recognized by Sukarno (among others) were they able to get rid of that blemish. Compare Blakker 
(1993). 6 
 
winning all of Indonesia over to their faith. Islamic opposition against that dominance 
began in 1967, when Christians were accused in a surge of pamphlets and 
inflammatory speeches
16
The state furthermore supported the ideal of modernization advanced by the 
missionaries, which characterized local societies as deficient and in need of 
development. State officials urged the indigenous peoples to bid farewell to their 
cultural ways, to abandon their rituals, to build modern houses, and to adopt modern 
techniques of farming. Local cultures were to be reduced to those aspects that could 
be marketed as folklore. This policy has changed after the enactment of regional 
autonomy laws since 1998. Spurred by an understandable self-interest, local and 
regional politicians in particular call for the revitalization of local cultures.
  of having lured Muslims into converting to their faith by 
distributing material aid. These demagogic pamphlets immediately triggered several 
anti-Christian riots, which began on 1 October 1967 with the demolition of churches 
in Makassar and subsequently spread to Java where Christian schools, churches, 
and cemeteries were vandalized. 
17
Christians are still accused of having collaborated with the former colonial 
government, and in the discourses of radical Muslim organizations they are portrayed 
as an extended arm of the ‘West’. Still today there exists the rhetoric of an allegedly 
disadvantaged  Muslim majority, associating  Christians with economic exploitation 
and a lack of morals, and stylizing itself as a majority with a minority status (Schreiner 
2001). While there is some legitimacy to this generalizing rhetoric it nevertheless 
misses the mark, because it ignores local causes of conflicts (such as strained 
relations between migrants and locals, transmigration projects, and the allocation of 
positions in local administrations) and does not realize that only few Christians are 
affluent. Moreover, the lack of identification of some groups with the Indonesian state 
is first and foremost due to tensions between center and periphery rather than to their 
adherence to the Christian faith. Muslim radicals who accuse Christianity of being 
anti-Indonesian ignore the fact that Christianity, just as  Islam, has become 
transformed from a foreign into an indigenous Indonesian belief system in the course 
of the past centuries. Undergoing a process of indigenization and adaptation to local 
traditions, it became a very multi-faceted, syncretistically oriented indigenous religion 
that still reveals the cultural heritage of the individual ethnic groups. Representatives 
of church and state have ambivalent feelings in the face of this appropriation and 
specific utilization of the foreign. Missionaries and indigenous priests appreciate the 
emancipatory facet of ‘enculturation’, yet they would like to restrict the latter to certain 
 Primordial 
sentiments and feelings of exclusive belonging are fostered by members of the local 
elites, mainly in times of elections. Ethnic and religious categories now undisguisedly 
serve as markers of collective identity, and amalgamate into criteria of social 
affiliation. Further conflicts thus seem almost inevitable, which may also complicate 
the coexistence of Christians with adherers of other faiths (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; 
Van Klinken 2000, 2003).  
                                                 
16  Another effective means employed were fake pamphlets in which Christians called for the 
proselytization of Indonesian Muslims. 
17 See Davidson and Henley (2007); Erb, Priyambudi and Faucher (2005). 7 
 
folkloristic aspects. Political representatives, on the other hand, honour the avowal to 
a high religion (agama) yet fear the potential of opposition inherent in syncretism. 
On many islands Christianity has contributed to overcoming ethnic boundaries 
and has become an integral component of modern regional identities. In regions 
where exploitation, ecological damages, military repression, and large-scale 
relocation programs (transmigrasi) are threatening to deprive people of their means 
of existence, Christian organizations have become institutions of resistance (such as 
in Papua and former East Timor). In other regions (Central Sulawesi, Moluccas) the 
Christian faith functions as a mobilization strategy when it comes to standing up for 
economic or political scopes of action, or to legitimizing xenophobia rooted in rural 
thinking (Flores).  
In spite of some mutual resentment the everyday relations between Christians 
and Muslims have been largely peaceful in the past,
18 and sometimes were even 
embedded in the autochthonous ritual system whose recent erosion was caused in 
equal measure by the activities of Islamic and Christian fundamentalists.
19
 
 
 
Local Conflicts and Religious Rhetoric in the Post-Suharto Era 
 
In the course of the new formation of local, regional, and national power 
structures following the fall of Suharto, it became apparent that the national unity 
based on religious acceptance was fiction rather than reality. On many islands there 
was an outbreak of civil-war like hostilities between Christians and Muslims.
20 Anti-
Christian militias proclaimed the complete elimination of the Indonesian Christians
21, 
and the danger  that a ‘Balcanization’ might occur was  suddenly  in the realm of 
possibility.
22 The collapse of firmly established power structures did not only pave the 
way for a profound process of democratization but also sparked power struggles 
among local and national elites, violence against minorities defined in religious and 
ethnic terms,
23  and a revival of secession  movements on islands  –  particularly 
Papua, East Timor, and Aceh
24
                                                 
18 See Beck (2002). 
 – that had already been striving to break away from 
the Indonesian nation-state for many years.  These struggles for political  and 
economic resources were religiously charged in many cases, that is, actors used a 
religious rhetoric to mobilize their followers, thus not only creating a closed collective 
19 Compare Bartels (this volume); Kreuzer (2000). 
20 Compare Aditjondro (2000a, 2000b); Aldahar (2000); Aragon (2001, 2002); Van Klinken (1999, 
2000, 2001). 
21 Compare Fealy (2001a, 2001b); Noorhaidi (this volume). 
22  Compare Bertrand (2004); Booth (1999); Crouch (2000); Huxley (2002); Lanti (2002); Rohde 
(2001); Schreiner (1999, 2000); Schröter (2001). 
23  While acts of violence targeted in particular the Chinese minority and Christians, yet it had 
specifically local connotations as well. On Kalimantan, for example, an alliance of Dayak and Malays 
rose up against Madurese migrants, who were perceived as intruders, in 1999, massacring and 
expelling thousands of them. The so-called Ninja murders in East Java, where masked gangs executed 
people who had been denounced as witches, were among the most unsettling incidents of that time.  
24 Compare Schreiner (2000); Schröter (2001). 8 
 
of their own, but also a collective of hostile ‘others’. The imagined communities 
(Anderson 1985) became reality in violent practice. This becomes very obvious from 
the conflicts that befell the Moluccas at the turn of the millennium. These conflicts 
also demonstrate the potency of historical reconstructions, of genealogies of conflict 
that have their origins way back in colonial times. 
This is particularly true for the conflicts between Muslims and Christians on the 
South Moluccas, whose main  and at the same time  central island is  Ambon.  In 
colonial times Christianized South Moluccans had privileged access to governmental 
positions and constituted part of the colonial armed forces. In the latter function they 
repeatedly put down rebellions, and were feared in the archipelago. According to 
Peter Kreuzer  (2000:14), from a Muslim  point of view the colonial powers had 
initiated a socioeconomic stratification of society on the basis of religious boundaries. 
Due to their loyalty to the Netherlands and their fear to lose their privileges, the 
Southern Moluccan Christians became a welcome  instrument of  Dutch power 
strategies following Indonesian independence, and in 1960 a secessionist movement 
supported by the former colonial government demanded independence from 
Indonesia and the proclamation of  a South Moluccan Republic (Republik Maluku 
Selatan).
25  In the course of the uprising there were repeated outbreaks of  anti-
Muslim violence.
26
Even so, the islands were for years considered as exemplary for a peaceful 
coexistence of indigenous Muslims and Christians.
  
27  Due to a massive influx of 
Muslims from Sulawesi in the 1970s and 1980s the delicate balance between the 
adherers of the two faiths shifted, and thus the economic equilibrium toppled as well 
(Jones 2002). The newcomers were viewed as aggressive businesspeople who in 
particular tried to get hold of positions in the local administration. These were 
traditionally in the hands of Christians. According to an estimate by van Klinken, 25% 
of the Ambonese population lived on government salaries in 1999;
28
In their struggle for governmental sinecure, both Christian and Muslim groups 
availed themselves of networks that extended all the way to Jakarta. In 1992 the 
Muslim Akib Latuconsina was appointed governor. His opponent was Freddy 
Latuhamina, a Christian who was a member of the then still ruling Golkar Party. 
Latuconsina filled several important positions in the local administration with fellow 
Muslims. When the rumor was spread that he had replaced all Christians in leading 
administrative positions with Muslims, bloody conflicts between Christians and 
Muslims erupted in Ambon in 1999 (Van Klinken 1999).  
 such shifts in 
the clientele structure thus inevitably caused extreme tensions. 
The potential for violence structurally inherent in that situation was intensified 
by the fact that both the Christian and the Muslim  networks were infiltrated by 
                                                 
25 Compare Decker (1957). 
26 Waver (1974:148-149) reports that there were executions by shooting, and that one imam was 
publicly cut in two with a sword in Ambon.  
27 However, there have always been considerable tensions between indigenous Moluccans avowing 
themselves to Christianity or Islam on the one side and Muslim migrants on the other. 
28 Compare van Klinken (1999). The incipient war fought in the media is discussed in the contribution 
by Birgit Bräuchler (this volume). 9 
 
criminal organizations. The latter’s members controlled shopping malls and gambling 
halls on Java but were also used as hard-hitting security units by various political 
factions. Armed conflicts between these groups were nothing unusual. In 1999 this 
type of gang fights was exported, so to speak, to the Moluccas: Christian and Muslim 
groups barricaded themselves in their respective sanctuaries – the Christians in the 
Maranatha Church, the Muslims in the Al-Fatah Mosque – and prepared for the clash 
with their adversaries. It took merely some catalyst to spark the actual fight. In 2000 
the conflict was further fuelled by a mobilization of radical Muslims who took across 
to the Moluccas from Java and other islands. A prominent part in this was played by 
the Laskar Jihad, a violence-prone fundamentalist organization that was 
counteracted on the Christian side by the so-called Laskar Kristus. 
The second conflict that got the Moluccas worldwide attention occurred in mid-
August 1999, involving migrants from Makian and the local population of the Kao 
subdistrict. The violence was unleashed by news that there were plans to establish a 
new subdistrict (kecamatan) named Makian Daratan in the southern half of the Kao 
district. The new subdistrict was to include all villages of Makian migrants who had 
been resettled in 1975 following the announcement of an imminent volcanic eruption 
in their homeland. Yet there were also some villages of the indigenous Pagu and 
Jaiolo in that region, who were not willing to let Makians govern them. A quarrel over 
resources was smouldering anyway between the Muslim migrants and the Christian 
Kao following the discovery of a gold mine in Malifut. The migrants, who according to 
Alhadar (2000:15) had developed a strong work ethic due to the circumstances of 
their displacement, were very successful as miners and thus aroused the envy of 
their indigenous neighbours.
29 In October 1999 the violence escalated to such an 
extent that about 15,000 Makians fled to Ternate and Tidore. What had basically 
started out as an ethnic conflict (even though the religious aspect had always been 
present because the majority of the Makians  were Muslims and the Kao were 
Christians) now emerged into an explicit conflict between Muslims and Christians. 
When  it  was  rumored  that Christians planned  to launch attacks,
30
                                                 
29 Compare Bubandt (2001). 
  the Makians 
chased  about 13,000  Christians  away  to North Halmahera  and North Sulawesi, 
where Christian militias murdered hundreds of  Muslims in December 1999. 
Thereupon tens of thousands of Muslims  demonstrated  in Jakarta on 7 January 
2000, calling for jihad on the Moluccas. The organizers of these protests included 
Amien Rais – the leader of the Muslim mass organization Muhammadiya, who is 
considered moderate – and the current Vice President, Hamzah Haz. Ja’far Umar 
Thalib, a preacher who had formerly fought in Afghanistan, was among the more 
radical participants, and advocated the implementation of the shari’a. Thalib recruited 
a group of men to battle the infidels on the Moluccas. Unhindered by the police and 
the military, about 3,000 members of the Laskar Jihad travelled to the Moluccas. It 
was not until May 2002 that Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono 
announced a governmental initiative aiming at the expulsion of the militias from the 
Moluccas. 
30 A fake flyer was in circulation, calling for holy war against the Muslims and for forced baptism. 10 
 
During the conflict on the Moluccas, both Christians and Muslims used  a 
religious rhetoric that put their struggle into a larger national context. While Christians 
viewed  the activities of the Laskar Jihad  as an attempt to Islamize Indonesian 
society, Muslims argued that there was a Christian conspiracy to weaken the nation. 
The separation of East Timor was thereby interpreted as the beginning of a potential 
chain  reaction  of secessions, and the Christian uprising on the Moluccas as a 
continuation of the ‘South Moluccan Republic’. As is pointed out by Dieter Bartels in 
his contribution to this volume, one of the reasons for the success of the religious 
rhetoric was the erosion of traditional alliance systems and ritual practices that once 
had united Christians and Muslims. 
 
 
Revitalization of Indonesian Islam, and Interreligious Tensions 
 
The conflict on the Moluccas outlined above was not the only of its kind. A 
similar, religiously charged spiral of violence was simultaneously set in motion in 
Central Sulawesi
31, a civil war that had already lasted for thirty years escalated in 
Aceh
32, and in Papua attempts at secession were suppressed by means of state 
terror
33. On Borneo, bloody conflicts erupted between the local Dayak population and 
immigrants from Madura Island
34, and smaller-scale uprisings flared up all over the 
archipelago. All of a sudden, neighbours who had been living side by side peacefully 
for decades began to massacre each other, and militias were formed.  Experts 
worried  that the nation was about to  break apart, and that there would  be a 
‘Balcanization’ just like in former Yugoslavia.
35
Religion has always been, and still is, a constituent factor of collective 
identities in Indonesia. While Christianity was ideologically associated with the Dutch 
  However, these scenarios did not 
become reality, and most of the abovementioned conflicts calmed down within a 
couple of years. The religious rhetoric did not dominate all of them anyway. The 
uprising of the Dayak against the Madurese, for example, was viewed as having a 
primarily ethnic connotation, even though the Madurese are Muslims and  many 
Dayak are Christians. The war of the Aceh guerrilla  against the Indonesian state 
likewise  had first and foremost an ethnic-nationalist  connotation,  even though 
historically it was definitely  spurred by religious motives as well, and the 
independence movement called for the implementation of the shari’a. The Papuans 
fought against political discrimination and the governmental immigration programs 
that had turned them into minorities in many districts of their own homelands. Still, it 
was not without significance that the migrants were Muslims while the Papuans are 
members of Christian churches, and were supported in their struggle by national and 
international Christian organizations. 
                                                 
31 See Aragon (this volume). 
32 Compare Aspinall and Crouch (2003). 
33 Bertrand (2004); Chauvel 2006; King (2004). 
34 Compare Davidson (2008); Peluso and Harwell (2001). 
35 Compare, among others, Almonte (2001); Bandoro (2002); Biddle (2002); Fealy (2002); Sukma 
(2002). 11 
 
colonial masters, Islam established itself as an anti-colonial liberation force as early 
as in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This became obvious when the so-
called  Padri  war broke out in 1821.
36  A radical Islamic movement,  inspired by 
pilgrims who had come in touch with the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
in Mecca, aimed for an Islamic renewal in West Sumatra, and started out a revolt 
against the local nobility. When the latter sought the assistance of the Dutch military 
after most members of the royal family had been murdered, did the revolt turn into an 
anti-colonial uprising.
37 From those days on, anti-colonial resistance had repeatedly 
been justified by using the metaphor of a holy war, one case in point being Aceh 
where the population fought against the Dutch occupation of its homeland for forty 
years
38; this struggle continued after World War II when the Dutch, who had before 
been expelled by the Japanese  army, tried to reconquer their former colonial 
possessions  by force of arms. The Islamic mass organization Nahdlatul Ulama 
issued a fatwa against the Dutch and the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations 
(Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia) declared the anti-colonial struggle as a religious 
duty.  Several Islamic organizations, such as the Sarekat Islam  (1911) and the 
Muhammadiyah (1912), were founded at the beginning of the twentieth century and 
became the think tanks of those striving for an  independent Indonesian nation.
39
Quite a few Muslim leaders felt betrayed by Sukarno’s policy, and defied it. 
They aimed for a Negara Islam Indonesia, an Islamic Republic of Indonesia, and 
refused to pay allegiance to the new government.  In West Java  the militiaman 
Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosowirjo declared  a region occupied by his partisans as 
Darul Islam (that is, the house or territory of Islam), and local warlords followed his 
example in South Sulawesi and Aceh. Up to the mid-1960s there were fights between 
government troops and the three regional wings of the Islamic Army of Indonesia 
 
Many Muslim leaders held the opinion that the special contribution of the Muslims to 
independence, but also the fact that they constituted the majority of the population, 
was to be reflected by the structure of the new nation. They envisioned Indonesia as 
an Islamic state, or at least as a nation that should grant Muslims a privileged status. 
Sukarno, the first president of the republic, realized that such a form of government, 
by assigning the status of second-class citizens to Christians and Hindus,  would 
doom the fragile budding nation to destruction from the very beginning. As a means 
to solve that problem, he  favored the Pancasila  model of a pluralist and multi-
religious nation, and he came out successful. 
                                                 
36 The war lasted from 1821 to 1837 and ended after the Padri leader Tuanku Imam Bonjol had been 
detained and exiled. 
37 Taufik Abdulla (1989) and Young (1994) have written on Islam and anti-colonial struggle in West 
Sumatra, Dobbin (1983) provides a detailed analysis on the course of the Padri war. 
38 The war against the Acehnese lasted from 1873 to 1904. It was the longest in the history of Dutch 
colonialism. Anti-colonial Islamic movements even used the metaphor of a Holy War.  The Acehnese 
resistance fighters declared a prang sabil, a holy war against the Dutch and mobilized in the name of 
Islam against the occupation of their homeland. See Teuku Ibrahim Alfian (2006). For an overview 
over Acehnese history see Reid 2005, 2006; for a general discussion of Islam and collective identity in 
Aceh compare also Aspinall 2009.  
39 Alfian (1994) hat written about the Islamic movement Muhammadiyah under colonial rule and 
Steenbrink (1993) focuses on the relationship between Dutch colonialism and Islam. 12 
 
(Tentara Islam Indonesia), and three sizeable regions of Indonesia were under the 
control and administration of the Islamists. One of the results of the Islamist uprising 
was an increasing repression of political Islam.  The state apparatus became 
tightened, and in 1959 Sukarno proclaimed his concept of  ‘guided democracy’ 
(demokrasi terpimpim), which vested him with powers  that took the principles of 
democratic decision making ad absurdum. In 1960 the oppositional Council of 
Indonesian Muslim Associations (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Masjumi) was 
prohibited. Under the second president, Suharto, who came to power due to a failed 
coup d’état attempted by communist organizations in 1965, the anti-Islamic course 
was maintained. A turnaround did not occur until 1990, when the foundations of the 
dictator’s power in the military became increasingly brittle and he went in search for 
new allies. Suharto tried to curry favor with the Muslim organizations, and from 1990 
furthered a revival of Islam at all levels of society. However, these concessions did 
not help him to remain in power, as the Islamic organizations were among those who 
forced Suharto to resign in 1998. 
Since that time,  orthodox and fundamentalist Islamic tendencies have 
increasingly gained ground in Indonesia. New political parties were founded, and one 
of these, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) was able to 
achieve undreamt-of success in elections.
40 New organizations formed as well; some 
of them, such as the Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam)  and the 
abovementioned Holy War Warriors (Laskar Jihad) mobilized the fight against both 
‘infidels’  and  Muslims suspected of living  a non-Islamic way of life. Since  the 
introduction of democracy,  Islamist groups have attacked  numerous Western 
institutions and Christian churches; the bloodiest of these assaults were the 
bombings  in Kuta on Bali, claiming 202 lives.  In 2005 the powerful Council of 
Indonesian Ulema (Majelis Ulema Indonesia, MUI)  issued eleven fatwas  in which 
they explicitly condemned liberalism, secularism, and pluralism as being un-Islamic. 
Moreover, Muslims were forbidden to pray jointly with members of other faiths, and to 
intermarry with Christians. These decrees issued by the MUI resulted in the closing of 
numerous small churches. According to Indonesian law, religious centers need to be 
accepted by the respective  neighbourhoods  surrounding them; if they are not, 
permission to build and maintain such buildings will not be granted. This is why many 
Christian churches are semi-legal, merely tolerated institutions. After the fatwas had 
been proclaimed, Muslims mobilized against these small houses of worship, and 
within a short time forced dozens of them to close.
41
                                                 
40 The party was founded as Justice Party in 1998 and changed its name into Prosperous Justice Party 
in 2002. During the 2004 elections the PKS won 7,3 % of the votes; 2009 they gained 7,9 %. 
  Violence against individual 
Christians is increasing as well, most notably in hot spots. On 16 October 2006, for 
example, the secretary general of the Protestant Church of Central Sulawesi, the 
Reverend Irianto Kongkoli, was killed by a shot in the head in broad daylight in the 
town of Palu. The resurgence of an orthodox or neo-orthodox Islam is highly visible in 
41  In response to the increasing threats to small churches, large houses of worship are built that 
accommodate hundreds or even thousands of believers. One of these is the Reformed Millennium 
Cathedral in the center of Jakarta, which opened in September 2008 and has room for 8,000 people. 13 
 
public life. Islamic clothing is dominating the streetscapes outside Jakarta, and a so-
called anti-pornography law issued in 2008 criminalizes everything that does not 
conform to the moral ideas of Islamic hardliners; at its own request the province of 
Aceh was granted the right to make the shari’a the basis of its criminal law, and 
shari’a bylaws were passed in many districts and communities. As a consequence, 
students in the city of Padang (West Sumatra) are now required to furnish proof that 
they are familiar with the Koran, female students and government employees have to 
wear the Islamic headscarf (jilbab), and the population has to participate in Islamic 
training courses. Since these measures were introduced there have been repeated 
assaults on women who were out in the public  without  a  male  escort, or whose 
clothing was not in conformity with Islam.  
All these developments make Christianity in Indonesia a topic of immediate 
interest in political and cultural terms. Nothing less is at stake than the governance of 
the Indonesian state as a pluralist nation, where adherers of many religions all share 
the same rights and duties. This is reason enough to look into this phenomenon in 
depth in a collection of essays. 
 
 
The Scope of This Book 
 
Yet unlike the introduction may suggest, this book is not a work of political 
science. It rather aims at elucidating the phenomenon of Christianity in Indonesia 
from the perspectives of various disciplines in order to grasp its diversity and to gain 
a deeper understanding. Some of the contributors to this volume were participants of 
a conference convened by Edwin Wieringa and myself at the Goethe-University of 
Frankfurt  in 2003; others agreed at a later time to write articles.  The authors 
represent various scholarly disciplines that in my opinion can contribute significant 
insights  to  the topic  under discussion:  history, social  anthropology, philosophy, 
theology, and political science.  
Generally, the authors’ search for insights into the phenomenon of Christianity 
in Indonesia was guided by the following questions: How did the Christian minority, 
which consists of various different churches and organizations, constitute itself 
historically? How was Christianity absorbed by the indigenous population, and how 
was it indigenized? How can we trace the process in the course of which adherers of 
local traditions became Christians? What impacts did Christianization have on those 
regions that were inhabited by Muslims? What were the neighbourly relations in 
these regions like? Did people create common rituals or forge alliances that were 
effective in maintaining peace? What historical roots can be identified with regard to 
contemporary conflicts? What insights can be gained by viewing violent conflicts 
between Christians and Muslims from the inside perspective of the local actors? And, 
last but not least, there was always the issue of new approaches to peace-keeping, 
of possibilities to continue the project of a pluralist Indonesia in the new millennium 
as well. 14 
 
The volume begins with an overview by Olaf Schumann of the intertwined 
histories of colonization and proselytization in Southeast Asia since the Portuguese 
conquest of Malacca in the sixteenth century. The scope of his discussion reaches 
far beyond the borderlines of contemporary Indonesia, as he puts an emphasis on 
the mutual relationships and interconnections found in a region that encompasses 
the postcolonial states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. In order to present a 
broader picture of Christianity during colonial times, I have included a contribution 
that focuses specifically on British Malaya: Holger  Warnk presents an in-depth 
discussion of an essential aspect of Christian missionary strategies, namely the 
establishment of an educational system intended to teach the subdued population 
virtues such as punctuality and obedience. He presents a detailed picture of the 
practices employed between 1890 and 1928 by colonial officials and missionaries of 
the American Mission Press with regard to educational policy, where the writing of 
school books in the Malay language played an important role. Karel Steenbrink puts 
Christian educational activities into the  context  of development aid programs, 
analyzing the commitment of the Catholic Church to such projects in Indonesia in the 
time between 1965 and 1980. The priests were masters in the art of raising funds for 
their endeavours,  and did by no means exclusively  draw  on  governmental and 
churchly sources of capital. Up to the 1980s Muslim organizations were unable to 
compete against the financial power of the churches, even in Muslim heartlands such 
as Java.  
These historical  contributions are followed by  case  studies dealing with 
Christianity in various regions of Indonesia. In a comparative approach, Raymond 
Corbey takes a critical look at the culturally destructive aspects of proselytization. His 
essay focuses on iconoclasm and the missionaries’ hostility towards indigenous 
material culture. He identifies the shattering or burning of masks, stones, ritual huts, 
and spirit figures as strategies successfully employed to expose the impotence of 
local beliefs, and to firmly establish Christianity as a powerful alternative. Yet 
iconoclastical practices were not always  performed  under duress. According to 
Corbey, in some cases the local actors were more than willing to give up their old 
sacred objects in favor of the new, powerful protective force.  
However, such radical changes did not take place in all regions of the 
Indonesian archipelago. In fact, there are significant differences between Protestant 
and Catholic mission areas. On the island of Flores, which has been within the 
sphere of influence of the Catholic Societas Verbi Divini since 1913, there was much 
less pressure on local traditions than in regions where Protestant missionary 
societies had established themselves. I shall  examine  the complex relationships 
between missionaries  and local actors  who  from  various  motives  weighed  the 
‘Foreign’  against  the ‘Own’. In that process, they created an indigenized form of 
Catholicism while at the same time sufficiently allowing for non-Christian religious 
practices.  
The articles of Susanne Rodemeier, Dieter Bartels, and Lorraine Aragon focus 
on the specific challenges emerging in multi-religious settlement environments. 
Susanne Rodemeier has conducted empirical research in the eastern  Indonesian 15 
 
Alor  Archipelago where Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics  are living together in 
narrow confines. She elucidates the integrative dimensions of shared myths and 
rituals, yet also points out that governmental interventions such as transmigration 
programs can destroy that fragile equilibrium within a short time. The consequences 
of such a collapse of indigenous models regulating religious coexistence become 
apparent in the contribution by Dieter Bartels. Bartels describes how indigenized 
versions of Protestantism and Islam that existed on the Moluccan island of Ambon 
were gradually purified, both by ambitious agents of the Protestant Church and the 
Islamic Muhammadiyah and by governmental decrees against adat; in that process, 
the integrative elements disappeared.  Many Ambonese  actors believe that the 
abovementioned violent conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the wake of the 
fall of Suharto were a result of these developments, and call for a reactivation of local 
religious structures. Lorraine Aragon revisits the history of religious rivalry between 
Christians and Muslims,  competitive Indonesian nationalism, and the unfolding of 
violent conflict in Central Sulawesi in the late 1990s. The competition between 
Protestants and Muslims for resources turned violent at transitional moments in 
politics, the most recent example being the post-Suharto Poso violence that erupted 
in late 1998 within the context of migration processes, global export markets, and 
land alienation pressures. Having started as a communal street fight in the midst of 
an unsavoury political campaign that went on in the district, the Poso conflict turned 
into a religiously polarized civil war where  calls for retaliation attracted non-local 
militias; later, that conflict aroused international attention in the wake of 11 
September 2001. 
Birgit Bräuchler, Sven Kosel, and Noorhaidi Hasan address rhetorics and 
strategies of action employed by actors in interreligious conflicts. Birgit Bräuchler 
analyses the role played by the Internet in the Moluccan conflict, using the example 
of the most important groups of actors: the Crisis Center of the Diocese of Ambon 
(CCDA) and the Masariku network on the Christian side, and the Forum Komunikasi 
Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama’ah (FKAWJ) on the Muslim side. Both sides employed the 
Internet as a means of self-representation and for mobilizing support, vied with each 
other for victimhood, and justified their own violent outrages by portraying them as 
acts of self-defence against an unscrupulous aggressor. Militant Christians in North 
Sulawesi felt justified to take action as well; that region, just as the South Moluccas, 
was characterized by a particular closeness to the Dutch colonial power in colonial 
times. Sven Kosel elaborates upon the interconnections between politics and 
paramilitary organizations, which have always played an important role in Indonesian 
history. Even though many of the militiamen enter service as mercenaries with the 
highest bidder, they all share a romantic ideology, viewing themselves as the 
defenders of a Christian Minahasa against Muslim dominance in Indonesia, which is 
perceived as threatening. The historical point of reference of these political-religious 
actors are events  –  most notably  the struggle for the representation of Christian 
minorities – that occurred when the independent Indonesian nation was born. The 
militiamen think of themselves as fighters of the Indonesian Pancasila nation against 
the Islamization of the state. Hasan Noorhaidi recounts a concurrent Islamic narrative 16 
 
justifying any kind of violence. Here, too, contemporary discourses can be linked to 
connecting factors in history. While Christian actors will turn to foreign supporters 
when it comes to mobilizing financial resources, their political arguments are rooted 
in  an Indonesian context.  Islamist actors, on the other hand, operate  on an 
international level in terms of discourse and practices. Noorhaidi refers to the phrase 
of a supposed global Jewish-Christian co-conspiracy, which is used by Indonesian 
Islamist groups such as the Laskar Jihad  or Laskar Mujahidin to justify their 
intervention in local conflicts. The combination of global, national, and local rhetoric 
became particularly apparent during the Moluccan conflict. It comes as no surprise 
that the political discourse tends to manifest totalitarian traits during crisis situations. 
Stereotyping, exaggeration, and a demonization of the other side in the conflict are 
convenient means of political propaganda  employed by agitators to mobilize their 
followers, persuade waverers, and to establish the ability to act. Religion in particular 
is excellently suited as a strategy of mobilization. However, there is no consensus 
about the question of whether this is due to an inherent problem associated with 
religion, that is, whether religion per se is a polarizing force and thus a threat to any 
multireligious society. This very issue is addressed by Franz Magnis-Suseno in his 
contribution. He has a critical look at the exclusive claims to truth inherent in the 
Abrahamite religions, and the difficulties of reconciling such claims with the 
prerequisites for pluralism. His pivotal question is: How can tolerance be achieved 
without abandoning one’s own claim to truth? According to Magnis-Suseno,  the 
answer to this philosophical and theological question, as well as political and 
economic dynamics, will be crucial in setting the future course of Indonesian society. 
On the one hand, he notes alarming tendencies towards ‘Arabization’  and an 
intolerant, dogmatic Islam. On the other hand, however, he points out that Indonesia 
looks back on a long tradition of intercultural and interreligious coexistence.  
 
 
Christianity in the Social and Cultural Sciences 
 
Until very recently, Christianity was a marginal topic in the social and cultural 
sciences. While anthropologists would occasionally produce articles dealing with 
conversion or processes involving the indigenization of Christianity observed within 
the context of their research on local cultures, they rarely put these issues at the 
center of their publications. Indeed, the authors of many anthropological monographs 
carefully avoid to mention that the societies described are Christian at all. Instead, 
they focus on tradition  and thus convey a picture of culture that is, so to speak, 
detached from the present. The reason for this is probably that Christianity was, and 
is, too strongly associated with the ‘Own’. Sociologists and political scientists, on the 
other hand, shunned the topic because they attributed little relevance to religion, and 
even historians – at least those studying the non-European world – only sporadically 
explored processes of Christianization or of the establishment of Christianity. 
However, this  attitude apparently has changed in the past couple of years. 
Christianity is becoming a topic whose relevance for issues of social development is 17 
 
recognized. In 2006, Fenella Canell attempted to initiate the establishment of an 
‘Anthropology of Christianity’, and since the mid-1990s several other authors (Hefner 
1993b; Veer 1996) have been discussing Christianity with regard to processes of 
modernization and modern nation building. As to Indonesia, there are a number of 
historical studies, with the works of Karel Steenbrink (1995, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 
2007) and Aritonang and Steenbrink (2008) deserving particular mention.  
The present volume contributes to these new approaches but goes beyond the 
scope of a single discipline. It offers an interdisciplinary perspective on the topic, 
instead, intertwining political science, theological, anthropological, philosophical, and 
historical dimensions. Such an approach is suitable in particular for discussing the 
phenomenon of Christianity in the Indonesian archipelago, which is characterized by 
a well-nigh confusing cultural diversity. 